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West Africa is one of the regions with the highest proportion of young people in the world. According to the African Population and Health Research Centre [1][1] Izugbara, C.O., Wekesah, F.M., Amo-Adjei, J., Kabiru, C.W., Tsala Dimbuene, Z.T. and Emina, J. (2017). Les jeunes en Afrique occidentale et centrale : Indicateurs sanitaires, démographiques, éducatifs et socioéconomiques [Young people in West and Central Africa: Health, Demographic, Educational and Socioeconomic Indicators]. African Population and Health Research Centre (APHRC), Nairobi, Kenya. Available here: https://aphrc.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Youth-in-WCA-FRENCH-report.pdf, one-third (35%) of its 468.7 million inhabitants (a figure forecast to reach 1.2 billion by 2050) are aged between 10 and 24. This demographic structure presents a paradox: despite representing a majority segment of society, young people have historically been marginalised from socio-political decision-making spaces [2][2] Afrobarometer (2024), La jeunesse africaine est engagée en faveur de la démocratie mais exprime une plus grande insatisfaction que ses aînés [AfricanYouth are Committed to Democracy, but Express Greater Dissatisfaction than their Elders]. Afrobarometer Report, 12 August 2024. Available here: https://www.afrobarometer.org/articles/la-jeunesse-africaine-est-engagee-en-faveur-de-la-democratie-mais-exprime-une-plus-grande-insatisfaction-que-ses-aines-revele-le-premier-rapport-phare-dafrobarometer/. In recent decades, however, this scenario has undergone a dramatic shift due to myriad factors, including growing internet access, the broadening of higher education and greater exposure to global conversations on rights, democracy and sovereignty.

The rise of digital technologies has afforded young people unprecedented access to information and has served as a catalyst for protest movements. Social media and communication platforms have enabled the swift organisation of demonstrations, the dissemination of alternative narratives and the denouncement of regimes seen as corrupt or authoritarian. Young people have moved from playing a passive role to taking centre stage in political advocacy, either demanding transparent electoral processes, as in the case of Senegal, or voicing their support for coups d’état in countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where disaffection with the political elites and foreign interference has fuelled pro-sovereignty sentiments.

Senegal and the Bid for Democratic Reform

Since its independence in 1960, Senegal has long been considered a paragon of political stability in West Africa; its democracy is frequently praised as an unshakeable pillar in the continent. However, despite this reputation for institutional robustness, Senegalese democracy was, in many respects, one of “low intensity”—a predominantly procedural and electoral system, structurally deficient when it came to consolidating its institutions and political parties. Such a positive impression has often overshadowed a more complex picture: a long-standing crisis of the presidential system and a gradual weakening of state institutions ruled by structures that have worn out over time.

Under Macky Sall’s regime, this institutional crisis reached new depths through a sophisticated manipulation of political mechanisms. A system was established in which electoral fraud, the weaponisation of the judiciary and suppression of dissent became commonplace [3][3] BBC (2024), Manifestations au Sénégal : ce qu’a dit Macky Sall sur le report de la présidentielle [Demonstrations in Senegal: What Macky Sall Had to Say About the Postponement of the Presidential Elections], 10 February 2024. Available here: https://www.bbc.com/afrique/articles/c51d4nj1240o. Arbitrary arrests, violent crackdowns on protests, direct executive interference in the courts, media censorship and a propagandistic misuse of state resources laid bare the structural fault lines that the country’s apparent democratic stability had disguised.

Between March 2021 and June 2023, Senegal drifted dangerously towards authoritarianism, combining a patrimonial State model and the radicalisation of presidential power. Macky Sall took authoritarianism to levels unprecedented in the country’s modern history, resorting to extreme tactics like shutting down internet access and arbitrarily forcing the closure of Cheikh Anta Diop University, one of the country’s most prestigious academic institutions. These actions fuelled the outrage of a youth who had already felt excluded from economic and political opportunities.

Despite the repression and violence endured, it was precisely this self-sacrificing yet resilient generation of young Senegalese that emerged as the main driving force in the fight for political change in the country. Faced with institutional choking and state brutality, youth mobilisation illustrates that, instead of remaining mere bystanders in politics, they are determined to take centre stage in redefining their democratic future.

It is worth remembering that this awakening of youth consciousness goes back several years to 2011 when the country similarly faced a surge of youth unrest over corruption, unemployment and the lack of opportunities. This upheaval gave rise to the “Y’en a marre” (“We’ve had enough”) movement, founded by rappers and journalists, who channelled their frustration into active political engagement.

The “Y’en a marre” movement was a decisive factor in the 2012 presidential elections, articulating the disaffection of the young and mobilising society against President Abdoulaye Wade’s bid for a third term, which defied the country’s democratic spirit. Through innovative strategies, like civic awareness campaigns, promotion of electoral registration and monitoring of the ballot casting procedure, the movement greatly contributed to the victory of Macky Sall, who at that time represented the hope for political renewal and the strengthening of democratic institutions.

Nevertheless, as time went by, the relationship between Senegalese youth and Macky Sall soured. In a twist of irony, the same leader who rose to power with their support tried, years later, to amend the Constitution in order to stand for a third term himself. This attempt was met with widespread condemnation, particularly from those very sectors of society that had propelled him to power in 2012. The government’s response was heavy-handed, including the disproportionate use of force, the judicial persecution of opposition figures and the media censorship, exposing the fragile nature of the Senegalese democratic system and certain leaders’ tendency to cling to power.

Faced with this scenario, the Senegalese youth once again assumed a critical role as arbiters of national politics, reaffirming their commitment to democratic principles. Disillusionment with Macky Sall led to mass mobilisation in favour of the opposition, particularly around figures such as Ousmane Sonko and Bassirou Diomaye Faye, who successfully leveraged popular discontent. This phenomenon highlights a distinctive feature of Senegalese youth: their organisational capacity and their willingness to challenge those who seek to undermine democracy, regardless of political affiliation.

Senegalese youth exceed their historical role as democratic arbiters by becoming a proactive force that formulates and advocates for its own demands. Representing a significant proportion of the population, this demographic has displayed a remarkable level of organisation and mobilisation around a wide variety of demands that express their current aspirations and concerns.

One of their main demands, in common with other young people around the world, is the creation of economic opportunities capable of mitigating an unemployment rate that disproportionately affects them. The lack of job prospects has led many youngsters to consider irregular migration as a viable alternative despite the risks that this entails. Organisations such as Collectif #480 have emerged in response to this problem, decrying those policies that perpetuate job insecurity and promoting a nationwide debate on irregular migration. This collective not only provides psychological support to the families of migration fatalities but puts pressure on the state to implement employment and sustainable development policies, thereby reducing the necessity to emigrate. [4][4] Momadou Diagne Lo and Nadir Gutiérrez Loayza (2020), La juventud senegalesa se organiza ante la falta de futuro [Senegalese Youth Organise in Response to the Lack of a Future]. El Salto Diario, 26 November 2020. Available here: https://www.elsaltodiario.com/senegal/juventud-senegalesa-migraci%C3%B3n

In addition to economic concerns, young people in Senegal are pushing for greater participation in political decision-making and more equitable representation in power structures. Social and student movements spearheaded demonstrations demanding reforms that would strengthen democracy and safeguard human rights. Such mobilisations have been instrumental in curbing power grabs and promoting more transparent and accountable governance.

In the sphere of sustainability and climate justice, young leaders such as Mariama Djambony Badji have promoted innovative, sustainable construction initiatives, promoting the use of local materials and traditional techniques adapted to present-day needs. These initiatives not only address environmental challenges but also seek to generate employment and revitalise cultural practices, contributing to the integral development of their communities. Programmes such as “les vacances patriotiques”, organised by the Jeunesse Patriotique du Sénégal (JPS), mobilise young people to participate in agricultural activities during their academic breaks. These initiatives seek to promote food self-sufficiency and revalue the agricultural sector, fostering responsibility and commitment to national development.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: Youths’ Support for the Military

The role of youth in West African politics reveals intricate dynamics that vary across each country’s context. While in Senegal, young people mobilised en masse to defend the democratic handover of power and prevent President Macky Sall’s bid for a third term in the countries of the Alliance of Sahel-Saharan States (French: Alliance des États du Sahel – AES), Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, a significant portion of the youth supported the military coups that overthrew elected governments. At first glance, this stance might appear contradictory: in one case, young people are fighting for democracy; in the other, they endorse the rupture of constitutional order. However, upon closer examination, we can see how both behaviours respond to the same impetus: the demand for a political system that is legitimate, effective and representative of the interests of the population.

In the AES countries, younger generations have been brought up in an instability-ridden environment where the social contract between the State and citizenry lies in disrepair. The insecurity caused by the expansion of Jihadist groups, endemic corruption, the lack of economic opportunities and institutional failure to meet the needs of the population have fuelled a deep-seated disaffection towards civilian governments. Added to this is the growing impression that these regimes have been more aligned with the interests of foreign powers than with the aspirations of their own citizens. In this context, many youngsters have come to see military coups as a means of steering their countries in a new direction, recovering national sovereignty and breaking with what they regard as an extension of colonial rule.

Youth support for the juntas does not necessarily represent an absolute rejection of democracy but rather an outpouring of frustration with political systems failing to guarantee security and wellbeing. In many cases, they have interpreted the military’s rise to power as an opening to rebuild the state on new foundations, no matter the use of exceptional means. However, this gamble raises questions about the future: will the military regimes live up to the expectations of change, or will they replicate the same problems as their predecessors? Is there a risk that these transitions will lead to new forms of authoritarianism?

In this context, the young people who have endorsed the coups d’état in the countries of the Alliance of Sahel-Saharan States argue that the transition to a new order must be based on fundamental principles such as justice, equity and respect for human rights. For them, a coup d’état should not be a simple shift in leadership, so much as an opportunity to reform the structures of power, build a solid legal framework and establish a rule of law that is truly at the service of the people. According to these advocates, this process must go beyond a mere transfer of power: it must involve a thorough decolonisation of the state, understood as a process of liberation from the power structures bequeathed by colonialism, which continue to influence government institutions and people’s daily lives.

The truth is that, in the post-colonial history of Africa, the quest for power has taken many forms, mirroring the complex social, political and economic realities of the continent. Over the decades, African countries have resorted to four main ways of seizing power: elections, often marred by lack of transparency and fraud; dynastic successions, whereby power has remained in the hands of a few families or groups; political settlements, often resulting from internal or external pressures; and finally, coups d’état, both military and parliamentary. This last method, the coup d’état, has been particularly frequent in the Sahel region and other parts of Africa, where democratic institutions have often been fragile or ineffective in the face of corruption, violence and poverty.

It is worth noting that some African countries, such as Ghana and Nigeria, underwent remarkable political and democratic re-founding owing to the efforts of military juntas, which, despite being seen at the time as agents of authoritarian change, played a crucial role in the reconfiguration of their respective political landscapes. The case of Ghana under the leadership of Jerry John Rawlings stands out in the political history of West Africa, as it marks a break with the usual pattern of coups d’état perpetuating the rule of authoritarian military governments. Unlike the many leaders who resorted to military might to cling to power, Rawlings justified his intervention as a means of restoring order, fighting corruption and laying the foundations for effective governance. His first coup in 1979 had a corrective purpose: he purged the army, executed senior military officers accused of corruption, carried out economic reforms and, a few months later, handed over power to a civilian government, thus demonstrating that his intention was not to hold on to power, but to correct the mistakes of the past.

Rawlings’ case provided a very persuasive argument to a significant proportion of youngsters in the AES, who would justify the military takeover because they should be given the chance to govern before being judged. This position might seem reasonable at first glance, but if one analyses these countries’ histories, it becomes clear that their militaries have held power for longer than their civilian counterparts. Thus, the idea that military rule should be somehow “tried out” as a novelty does not withstand scrutiny. Historically, most coups d’état in Africa have led to ineffective regimes led by the military with no political training or vision of economic governance, which has generated even deeper crises in the name of the interests of the people.

Furthermore, coups d’état tend to lead to a hardening of power, as any government that seizes control by force will live under the constant threat of being overthrown by some other power. Paradoxically, in the case of the AES states, this dynamic has led to ousted civilian leaders seeking foreign military support to restore their authority, thus reenacting the well-known imperialist cycle in which democracy is re-established by coercion.

Factors Influencing Youth Support for Military Regimes in the AES

The disenchantment of AES youth towards their elected governments is not an isolated phenomenon but the result of years of cumulative failure in formal democracy and political, economic and social management. The inability of governments to deliver basic security in the face of advancing terrorism and endemic corruption has eroded confidence in state institutions. As a result, many youngsters no longer think of the military as a threat to democracy but as an alternative to restoring order and national dignity.

The ever-growing presence of jihadist armed groups such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) has plunged the Sahel into an unprecedented security crisis. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, civil governments have been criticised for their failure to curb the violence, especially in rural areas, where terrorist attacks have left thousands dead and displaced. Since 2012, Mali has faced an insurgency in the north that has spread to the centre of the country, despite the intervention of international peacekeeping forces such as the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and the France-led Barkhane operation. According to the Global Terrorism Index [5],[5] Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2023: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism. Sydney, March 2023. Available here: http://visionofhumanity.org/resources Mali ranks among the countries most affected by terrorism worldwide.

Burkina Faso has followed a similar trajectory, experiencing an exponential increase in attacks since 2015. The lack of an effective strategy on the part of the civilian government of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré led to his deposition in 2022. In Niger, although the country was considered relatively more stable, the Tillabéri region, bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, has become an epicentre of violence. The administration of Mohamed Bazoum, overthrown in 2023, stood accused of failing to prioritise security in these areas.

The youth have been the most affected by this insecurity. Many have lost family members, been displaced or, in some cases, recruited by terrorist groups. For them, civilian governments have not only failed in their duty to protect the population but have rather displayed a complete lack of political will to tackle the problem.

Adding to this security crisis is corruption, which has further undermined confidence in civilian governments. In all three countries, the elites have been accused of lining their pockets at the expense of public resources while the majority of the population remains mired in poverty. During the government of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta (2013-2020) in Mali, accusations of corruption were commonplace, and the country ranks among the worst on Transparency International‘s Corruption Perceptions Index [6][6] Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2023. Available here: https://transparencia.org.es/wp-content/uploads/Report_CPI2023_English.pdf. In Burkina Faso, Kaboré’s efforts against corruption were perceived as insufficient, and scandals such as the misuse of funds destined for combating terrorism sparked outrage. In Niger, despite some progress in governance under Bazoum’s mandate, corruption remained a persistent challenge, particularly impacting young people, who denounced the lack of economic opportunities and the disconnect between elites and citizens.

In these countries, over 60% of the population is made up of young citizens, but many of them feel excluded from political and economic decision-making. According to the African Youth Survey (2022), 68% of youth in the Sahel believed that their governments did not represent their interests [7][7] Ichikowitz Family Foundation, African Youth Survey 2022. Available here: https://ichikowitzfoundation.com/storage/ays/ays2022.pdf. This disconnect has created a legitimacy vacuum that the military has successfully exploited to present itself as an alternative.

In times of crisis, military forces are often perceived as disciplined and capable of restoring order. In Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, coups d’état have been justified as necessary measures to “save” the country from chaos. Army leaders have adopted populist rhetoric, promising to end corruption and restore national dignity, a message that has resonated with the youth.

The Rejection of Neo-Colonialism and Foreign Military Presence

The rejection of neocolonialism and foreign military presence was also one of the determining factors in the support of young people for the military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This feeling is deeply rooted in a history of colonial domination and in the perception that foreign powers, particularly France, have perpetuated a relationship of dependency that limits the sovereignty and autonomous development of these countries. France, as a former colonial power, has maintained significant influence in the politics and security of the region, especially through military operations such as Barkhane in Mali, which was presented as an initiative to combat terrorism and stabilise the area. However, far from fulfilling its stated objectives, this presence has been perceived as a resounding failure. Not only did it fail to contain the expansion of Jihadist groups, but in many ways, it exacerbated insecurity, leading to deep resentment among the local population. In particular among young people, who interpret these interventions as a covert form of neocolonialism in the guise of international cooperation.

In this context, the military junta’s ousting of French troops from Mali in 2022 met with enthusiasm among many young Malians. For them, this decision was not simply a change in security policy but an act of affirmation of national sovereignty and a symbolic rebuff to decades of foreign interference. According to an article in Jeune Afrique, 75% of young Malians supported the departure of France, arguing that its presence was not only ineffective but also perpetuated a relationship of subservience that prevented the country from seizing the reins of its own destiny [8][8] Bokar Sangaré, Mali-France: Je t’aime, moi non plus [Mali-France: I Love You, but Not Anymore], Jeune Afrique, 1 February 2022. Available here: https://www.jeuneafrique.com/1305419/politique/mali-france-je-taime-moi-non-plus/. This sentiment is not limited to Mali: in Burkina Faso and Niger, young people have also expressed a growing rejection of foreign military presence, especially after the governments of these countries signed cooperation agreements with France that, in practice, handed over significant control over their armed forces and security policies.

This rejection of neocolonialism is not limited to the military sphere but also extends to politics and the economy. Many in the Sahel perceive local political elites as being more aligned with the interests of foreign powers than with the needs of their own population. This perception is reinforced by economic agreements that critics say benefit French companies more than local economies. The exploitation of natural resources such as uranium in Niger or gold in Mali, for example, has been strongly criticised by grassroots youth movements, who accuse foreign companies of extracting wealth without creating meaningful development for local communities. This sentiment of economic exploitation adds to resentment over military presence, creating an explosive cocktail of discontent that military regimes have been able to capitalise on.

Moreover, the pro-sovereignty discourse espoused by the military juntas has resonated profoundly with the young, for whom they are leaders willing to challenge the status quo and defend national interests against foreign interference. In Mali, for example, the military government has sought alternative alliances with actors such as Russia through the Wagner group, presenting this collaboration as a way to counter French influence and regain control over the national territory. Although this strategy has been roundly criticised by some sectors of the international community, it has struck a chord with many young people, who see it as a way of breaking with their country’s historical dependence on France and exploring new avenues of cooperation.

In Search of a New Sovereigntist Paradigm

In the Sahel, the search for a new sovereigntist paradigm represents a fundamental shift in the way young people in the region conceive the future of their countries. This movement, largely led by a generation raised in a time of globalisation, information access and increasing political awareness, seeks to redefine the traditional ties of dependency with foreign powers while building a model based on self-determination, social justice and South-South cooperation. This approach is not simply a reaction against neocolonialism but an assertive bid to reimagine the role of Sahelian states on the global and regional stage, as well as to redirect internal priorities towards local development and equity.

This change in mindset has led young Sahelians to place greater emphasis on regional cooperation as a cornerstone of this new paradigm. The creation of the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES) between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is a prime example of this effort. Not only does this partnership strive to strengthen collective security against the Jihadist threat, but it promotes a common agenda that prioritises regional interests over external impositions. For the young, the AES represents a step towards integration and solidarity between countries facing similar challenges, as well as an opportunity to build local solutions to problems exacerbated by foreign intervention. The idea that the Sahelian states can and should resolve their own challenges without relying on external actors has gathered momentum, especially among a generation that has witnessed the limitations and failures of externally imposed strategies.

But this new sovereigntist paradigm is not limited to the sphere of foreign policy: it also encompasses a demand for profound internal reforms, prioritising local development and social justice. Young people have been key voices in the call for their countries’ natural resources to have beneficial impacts on the local population and not be exploited for the benefit of foreign multinationals or corrupt elites. In countries such as Niger, where uranium wealth contrasts with high levels of poverty, or in Mali, where gold mining has yielded huge profits for foreign companies while local communities remain impoverished, this demand has become particularly urgent. For many youngsters, sovereignty is not only a matter of international relations but also of justice and fair distribution of wealth. This approach has fuelled an increase in activism around issues such as transparent management of natural resources, public participation in decision-making and the provision of economic opportunities for marginalised communities.

Furthermore, the search for a new sovereigntist paradigm has been coupled with a narrative that emphasises dignity and national pride. Young people in the Sahel do not want to remain passive actors in a global system that marginalises them; they aspire to be the architects of their own destinies. This sentiment is reflected in cultural, educational and political initiatives that seek to revalue local identities and promote a sense of belonging that transcends ethnic and regional divisions. In this sense, sovereigntism is not just a political stance, but a cultural and social project that seeks to rebuild confidence in the region’s capacities and potential to overcome its challenges.

The youth of West Africa have shown remarkable resilience and adaptability in the face of many challenges. Whether through democratic mobilisation in Senegal, where they took to the streets to defend political turnover and prevent the re-election of President Macky Sall, or by backing military interventions in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, where they supported the juntas that overthrew governments perceived as ineffective and corrupt, young people have emerged as central actors in the reconfiguration of the region’s political landscape. Their role cannot be reduced to a simple dichotomy between democracy and authoritarianism; rather, it reflects a far-reaching and pressing search for solutions to the structural problems that have marked their lives: insecurity, corruption, lack of opportunities and foreign interference.

Understanding the role that younger generations play in these processes demands that we analyse the factors shaping their decisions and explore the extent to which their support for the military juntas represents a real alternative or an expression of desperation in the face of a lack of viable options. In Senegal, young people mobilised to defend a democratic system which, although imperfect, offered them a framework to demand change and hold their leaders accountable. In contrast, in the Sahel, where democratic institutions were perceived as incapable of guaranteeing security and justice, many saw the military as a pragmatic option to restore order and regain national sovereignty. This apparent contradiction is nothing more than the expression of a youth that, far from homogenous or dogmatic, acts as an arbiter of the political processes in their countries, assessing each context and making decisions based on the immediate realities they face.

What emerges from this examination is a generation that, despite adversity, is not resigning itself to the status quo. Young people in West Africa are redefining their role in politics, no longer as mere spectators but as protagonists, demanding that institutions respond to their own aspirations. Their mobilisation, whether on the streets of Dakar or in the military barracks of Bamako, is a call to action to build a future where dignity and self-determination are not privileges but fundamental rights. This impetus, although marked by challenges and contradictions, is also a beacon of hope. The region’s youth have proven that, even in the most difficult of times, it is still possible to fight on.

The road towards that future is not free of hurdles. Consolidating democracy in Senegal and the search for a new sovereignty paradigm in the Sahel raise thorny questions about how to secure truly representative and accountable institutions. However, the energy, creativity and determination of youth offer grounds for optimism. Their ability to mobilise, challenge power structures and propose innovative alternatives is a sign that, despite everything, West Africa is in the midst of a process of sweeping transformation. And in this process, youth is not only a force for change but also the promise of a more just and equitable future.

Ultimately, the story that is being written in West Africa is that of a generation that refuses to be defined by the limitations of their present. Whether defending democracy or seeking new forms of sovereignty, they are making it clear that their voice cannot be ignored. Their struggle is not only for power but for the possibility of a world where justice, dignity and development are not distant dreams but realities within everyone’s reach. In that struggle lies the hope of a continent that, despite its trials and tribulations, marches ever onward towards a brighter future.

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